WHERE DOES THE MONEY REALLY GO?
Likely you have read the 21 August e-mail from the Wells College Board of Trustees. CCFW received top billing in the letter’s first paragraph, which detailed the college’s attempts to fund raise after closure. While the college claims to recognize our devotion, it implies that it is sorely misplaced: We are chided for not accepting the inevitable, and accused of having “diverted funds from Wells and …. created delays in many wind-down efforts.” We are told, yet again, that the Board worked ceaselessly to find every possible way forward, but none could be found and – while the “duty of loyalty” allegedly prevents board members from letting us know what actions they took, we should TRUST that no more could be done.
While board deliberations and actions remain a closely guarded secret, thus preventing anyone on the outside from judging whether or not members actually worked in the best interests of the institution, the college’s 990 forms – a nonprofit’s tax returns – are publicly available, and give us a better understanding of the fiscal operations of the college, and their consequences. Below is one example of how the college spent significant amounts of money, over multiple years, for not only no results, but to find themselves even worse off than before. What CCFW has raised pales in comparison with this example.
In 2016, the beginning of Jonathan Gibralter’s tenure, enrollment was at a relatively healthy 563 students. For a college that depended heavily on tuition for its operating budget, this was good news. The new president allegedly promised to increase enrollment incrementally to 700 students – more good news. What happened over the nine years of President Gibralter’s tenure? Some numbers went up, others plunged – and the news was not the good news that had been anticipated.
What plunged were the enrollment numbers. In 2017, in just one year, enrollment dropped precipitously from 563 students to 511; in 2018 it dropped further to 482 students. These were the same two years in which the college hired a Student Search Services firm for a total of $685,127. In addition to these expenditures, the president’s total compensation rose, principally due to bonuses for …. well, it was not for the promised increase in enrollment numbers. By 2020, enrollment had fallen to 416 – a total loss of 147 students. Yet that year and the previous year, the president received two annual bonuses of $78,300 each.
Enrollment continued to plunge, dropping from 416 in 2020 to 353 in 2021. Disruption and uncertainty from the pandemic can explain some of this enrollment loss, but these numbers are still part of a very consistent pattern. In 2021, the college hired a second Student Search Services firm – consisting of former employees from the previous firm – and over the next three years paid them a total of $1,705,489. Enrollment continued to drop, though not as precipitously, bottoming out at 333 students in 2023 (and with only a 46% retention rate for returning first-year students). The president’s bonuses also dropped, but did not end until 2023, despite his complete failure to increase enrollment in any of the nine years of his tenure.
What happened? Why did the expenditure of $2,390,616 result in the college losing 40% of its previous enrollment in just 9 years? Did these firms give bad advice? Did they give good advice that was ignored? The second firm has claimed that there is no “enrollment cliff” – the latest watchword of alarm – that students are out there, and that they will find them, yet they failed to do so. Each firm has a splashy website that makes bold and assured promises of success, but this did not materialize in the case of the services either firm provided to Wells. Further, careful research has found that the “corporate headquarters” of the first firm are a mail box at a Cedar Rapids PakMail; the second firm’s address turns out to be a mail box at the US Post Office in Oneonta, New York. Perhaps such firms now operate 100% remotely. But given their complete failure to deliver on their promises, it is logical to question the effectiveness of such operations.
What could the college have done differently to increase enrollment? We know that when students have the opportunity to visit the campus, its beautiful setting is often the deciding factor for many who decide to enroll. And we know that Wells alums know Wells best, and are willing and able to generate interest and enthusiasm in potential students, and they will do it for love of the college, not because they are being paid huge sums of money.
Yet we have heard troubling rumors over the years that the college discouraged or discontinued the participation of alumnae and alumni at college fairs. Alums have told us that they have contacted the college to help by participating in college fairs in their local areas, but never received any response from Wells. We have also heard that outreach at high schools – and in particular those in the local area, traditionally a source of many students for Wells – diminished or may not have been happening at all.
If true, why did the college fail to take advantage of time-tested and effective methods of student recruitment? Why did it continue to pay large sums of money to firms whose efforts resulted in a steady and devastating DECREASE in enrollment? Knowing all this about just one aspect of the college’s operations, how can we accept that the administration and trustees tried everything possible to save her?
(Originally published on 3 September 2024)